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 PROVISION: A CASE FOR REPEAL 
 
DREW THORNLEY* 
ABSTRACT 
Using as a case study the recent “5Pointz” litigation, a case involving visual artists’ 
moral-rights claims to graffiti they drew on a piece of private property in Queens, New 
York, this article examines the threat that VARA’s grant to visual artists of the right 
“to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature” poses to common-law 
property and contract rights. This article advances the argument that the default legal 
rule should be that the rights of property owners (real or personal), including the right 
to destroy such properties, trump any moral rights that visual artists claim are affixed 
to a property. Ultimately, this article recommends repealing the aforementioned right 
“to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,” leaving the traditional 
rules of property law and contract law to determine when, if ever, visual artists’ moral 
rights have legal priority over the rights of property owners.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”)1 is an addition to United States 
copyright law that grants certain protections to visual artists. Specifically, VARA 
protects the “moral rights” of visual artists, a statutory first in United States copyright 
law.2 One of these moral rights includes the right “to prevent any destruction of a work 
of recognized stature.”3 Using the “5Pointz” litigation as a case study—a case 
involving visual artists’ moral-rights claims to graffiti they drew on a piece of private 
property in Queens, New York—this article examines the threat that this right “to 
prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature” poses to common-law rights, 
with regard to private property and contracts. In the 5Pointz4 litigation, a federal 
district court judge ruled, for the first time, that a property owner violated visual 
artists’ moral rights, per VARA, and awarded the artists $6.75 million.5  
 In addition to arguing against the trial court’s ruling in the 5Pointz litigation, this 
article advances the argument that the default legal rule should be that the rights of 
property owners (real or personal), including the right to destroy their properties, 
trump any moral rights that visual artists claim to art affixed to the property. 
Ultimately, this article recommends repealing the aforementioned VARA provision 
regarding the right “to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,” 
leaving the traditional rules of property and contracts to determine when, if ever, visual 
artists’ moral rights have legal priority over the rights of property owners.  
If this provision is not repealed, more rulings placing the moral rights of visual 
artists above the traditional rights of property owners can be expected. As such, 
property owners who wish to avoid such rulings should either not allow visual art on 
their properties or should, as VARA instructs, receive a written waiver of rights from 
visual artists prior to allowing such art on their properties. The former option is a surer 
form of protection for property owners, but it would lead to fewer mediums for visual 
art, and therefore, may inhibit the public’s access and exposure to visual art, which, 
according to VARA, is culturally important enough to warrant moral-rights 
protections.6 The latter option could also lessen the quantity of visual art, because it 
would preserve a property owner’s right to destroy such art; but, more fundamentally, 
the option is problematic because it places upon a property owner the burden of 
securing a waiver. The more appropriate course of action would be to require a visual 
artist to receive an express grant of moral rights from a property owner, before such 
rights attach to art on a property owner’s property. 
The great irony of the 5Pointz ruling, which placed for the first time visual artists’ 
moral rights over a property owner’s rights, is that it was meant to enforce VARA and, 
in turn, to protect visual art, but might ultimately thwart the creation and preservation 
of such art. The ruling should serve as a wake-up call to any property owner who might 
recognize that his ability to use his property as he wishes is in jeopardy. Far from 
                                                          
 1  17 U.S.C. §106A (2012). 
 2  See id. 
 3  §106A(a)(3)(B).  
 4  See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 5  Id. at 488. 
 6  See Christopher R. Matthews, VARA's Delicate Balance and the Crucial Role of the 
Waiver Provision: Its Current State and Its Future, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 139, 142–43 (2003). 
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helping visual art flourish, the 5Pointz ruling could end up being the catalyst for 
property owners implementing preventive measures, resulting in the opposite effect. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”) is an amendment to the 
Copyright Act of 1976 that grants certain non-economic “moral rights” to visual 
artists, a statutory first in federal copyright law.7 Congress passed VARA in response 
to the United States joining the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, which requires signatories to protect visual artists’ moral rights.8 The 
United States officially became a Berne Convention signatory in 1989, when it enacted 
the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.9 Congress enacted VARA on 
December 1, 1990, and VARA took effect on June 1, 1991.10 Other countries, and 
even some U.S. states, recognized (to varying degrees) the moral rights of visual 
artists, prior to VARA’s enactment.11  
                                                          
 7  Prior to VARA’s enactment, several U.S. states passed moral-rights legislation, 
beginning with California’s enactment of the California Art Preservation Act of 1979, CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 987 (1979). 
 8  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6, Sept. 9, 
1886 (“(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said 
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said 
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. (2) The rights granted to the author 
in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until 
the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions 
authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. However, those 
countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does 
not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding 
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. 
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed 
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.”). 
 9  International Copyright Relations of the United States, CIRCULAR 38A (U.S. Copyright 
Office, D.C.), Jan. 2019, at 2.  
 10  Nathan Murphy, Theme et VARAations: Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Should Not 
Protect Works-In-Progress, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 110, 113 (2010). 
 11  See Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 266, 268 (2009) (“The 
concept of moral rights originated in nineteenth century France and has long been recognized 
by most civil law countries . . . . European moral rights laws are far more extensive than their 
U.S. counterparts in a number of important ways.”); David Shipley, The Empty Promise of 
VARA: The Restrictive Application of a Narrow Statute, 83 MISS. L. J. 985, 988 (2014) 
(“VARA . . . provides less protection than most European moral rights legislation.”); Jacqueline 
Lipton, Moral Rights and Supernatural Fiction: Authorial Dignity and the New Moral Rights 
Agendas 497–540 (Case Res. Paper Series in Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 2011-6, 2011), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1802788 (“Moral rights can encompass a variety of different elements 
of the author’s relationship with her work, and the exact scope of the rights differs from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction . . . . However, it is worth noting that some civil jurisdictions maintain 
a broader array of moral rights. Courts in a number of civil law jurisdictions have recognized 
additional rights such as the right to refuse to create, the right to create and publish in any form 
desired, the right to withdraw or destroy the work, the prohibition against excessive criticism, 
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VARA grants several moral rights to the author of a work of visual art.12 First, the 
author of a work of visual art maintains the right “to claim authorship of that work”13 
and “to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which 
he or she did not create.”14 Second, the author “shall have the right to prevent the use 
of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation.”15 Finally, the author has the right “to prevent any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial 
to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or 
modification of that work . . . .”16 and “to prevent any destruction of a work of 
recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
work . . . .”17 This last right—the right “to prevent any destruction of a work of 
recognized stature”—is the central focus of this article.18 The rights granted by VARA 
are: (1) granted only to the author of a work of visual art, regardless of whether the 
author owns a copyright to the work, and authors of joint works of visual art are co-
owners of such rights;19 (2) valid only for the life of the author(s);20 and (3) not 
transferable, but are waivable if the author expressly agrees to such a waiver via a 
signed writing.21 
VARA is a seldom-litigated statute, but a recent well-publicized dispute highlights 
the potential threats VARA poses to fundamental principles of property and contract 
and, thus, to fundamental American freedoms. 
                                                          
and the prohibition against other injuries to the creator’s personality. Even the more well 
accepted rights of integrity and attribution vary in nature and scope from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.”). 
 12  See generally Shipley, supra note 11, at 987–88, 992 (“This legislation recognized 
several moral rights in the United States for the first time” and “VARA grants three moral rights 
to the creators of qualifying works of visual art”). 
 13  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 14  § 106A(a)(1)(B). 
 15  § 106A(a)(2). 
 16  § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
 17  § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
 18  Id. 
 19  See § 106A(b). 
 20  See § 106A(d). 
 21  See § 106A(e)(1) (“The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, but 
those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument 
signed by the author. Such instrument shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that work, 
to which the waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so identified. 
In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors, a waiver of rights under this 
paragraph made by one such author waives such rights for all such authors.”). 
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B. The 5Pointz Litigation22 
In 1993, Gerald Wolkoff, the owner of an abandoned factory in Long Island City, 
Queens, granted permission to various graffiti artists to paint the outer wall of the 
building.23 Painting continued in the ensuing years, but the endeavor was somewhat 
disorganized and “distasteful” until 2002, when Wolkoff granted Jonathan Cohen, one 
of the building’s graffiti artists, permission to coordinate the building’s artistic 
activities.24 The partnership progressed smoothly, and this site, known as 5Pointz, 
became a graffiti hotspot and tourist attraction.25  
Such was the reality until 2013, when Wolkoff filed an application with the City 
of New York to construct luxury condominiums on the site, a project that would call 
for the demolition of 5Pointz.26 Various 5Pointz artists launched efforts to save the 
                                                          
 22  This section simply presents the facts surrounding the 5Pointz dispute, without 
editorializing on any aspects of the case. Any commentary about the case will be found in the 
following section.  
 23  See Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 24  See id. at 218–19 (“Starting in the early or mid-1990s, the exterior walls had become a 
place for distasteful graffiti by many self-proclaimed aerosol artists; it was then known as the 
Phun Phactory. To control this festering problem, Cohen approached Wolkoff in 2002 to 
become the curator of the works that would be permitted to be painted on the walls. Wolkoff 
agreed; Cohen, known in the art world as ‘Meres One,’ was one of the principal contributors to 
the aerosol wall paintings and Wolkoff liked his work. Wolkoff ‘was supportive of creative 
efforts but wanted somebody responsible to manage it.’ But nothing was put in writing; it was 
just the ‘general understanding that [Cohen] would be allowed to select who would be permitted 
to paint on the walls.’ Wolkoff, therefore, gave his oral blessings to permit qualified aerosol 
artists, under Cohen's control, to display their works on his buildings. Soon the quality of the 
aerosol art vastly improved. The site became known as 5Pointz and evolved into a mecca for 
high-end works by internationally recognized aerosol artists.”) (citations omitted); Samantha 
Schmidt, N.Y. Landlord Obliterated Dozens of Graffiti Murals. Now He Owes the Artists $6.75 
Million, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2018/02/13/a-landlord-obliterated-dozens-of-graffiti-murals-now-he-owes-the-artists-
6-7-million/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5c06543e6bfb (“More than a decade before the artists 
and their landlord were at odds, the two parties enjoyed a thriving partnership. In the 1990s, 
Wolkoff rented studios in the warehouse complex to local artists. He also began allowing graffiti 
artists to spray paint on the building walls. But there was not much order or control over the 
quality of the work—until one tenant, Jonathan Cohen, took charge. Cohen, a local artist known 
as Meres One, became the unpaid curator of what would become 5Pointz. Cohen organized a 
creative system in which aerosol artists would compete for prominent placement on the walls, 
according to court documents. He divided up the space into two areas: Short-term walls, which 
catered to beginner artists and would be painted over on a rotating basis; and long-term walls, 
which were permanent. Wolkoff gave Cohen and hundreds of other artists free rein to paint 
whatever they pleased, with only three exceptions: no religion, politics or sex. Artists from all 
backgrounds poured in from all over the world.”). 
 25  See Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 219 (“Soon the quality of the aerosol art vastly improved. 
The site became known as 5Pointz and evolved into a mecca for high-end works by 
internationally recognized aerosol artists.”).  
 26  See id. at 220 (“When questioned by the court, Wolkoff testified that there was no 
feasible engineering way he could preserve the existing buildings, with their ‘beautiful’ art 
work, and incorporate them into the new ones.”). 
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site and, thus, their art.27 Ultimately, in October 2013, Cohen and other 5Pointz artists 
petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for a 
preliminary injunction against the demolition of the building, citing the rarely-litigated 
VARA.28 On November 12, 2013, United States District Court Judge Frederic Block 
declined to issue a preliminary injunction and stated he would soon issue a 
written opinion.29  
In that written opinion,30 issued on November 20, 2013, Judge Block remarked, 
“[t]his marks the first occasion that a court has had to determine whether the work of 
an exterior aerosol artist—given its general ephemeral nature—is worthy of any 
protection under the law.”31 Ultimately, Judge Block opined: 
Finally, whether viewed as bearing upon the issue of irreparable harm or 
the balancing of the hardships, the ineluctable factor which precludes either 
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief was the transient nature of the 
plaintiffs’ works. Regardless of Cohen’s belief that the 24 works were to 
be permanently displayed on the buildings, he always knew that the 
buildings were coming down—and that his paintings, as well as the others 
which he allowed to be placed on the walls, would be destroyed. 
Particularly disturbing is that many of the paintings were created as recently 
as this past September, just weeks after the City Planning Commission gave 
final approval to the defendants’ building plans. In a very real sense, 
plaintiffs’ have created their own hardships. 
 
But this does not mean that defendants do not share some responsibility. 
After all, Wolkoff gave his blessings to Cohen and the aerosol artists to 
decorate the buildings, and he did not choose to protect himself from 
liability by requiring VARA waivers. Moreover, while he was supportive 
of the artists and appreciated their work, he also stood to benefit 
economically from all the attention that had been drawn to the site as he 
planned to market the new buildings’ residences. Since, as defendants’ 
                                                          
 27  See Schmidt, supra note 24 (“When the artists got wind of the landlord’s plans to replace 
the warehouses with high-rise luxury condos, they began a campaign to try to save 5Pointz. 
Cohen filed an application with the City Landmark Preservation Commission to preserve the 
site but was rejected because the artistic work was too recent. He also tried to raise money to 
buy the property, but its value soon skyrocketed to more than $200 million. Even Banksy, a 
reclusive and famed British street artist, made a plea during a trip to New York in 2013. ‘Save 
5Pointz,’ he wrote.”). 
 28  See id. (“As a final resort, Cohen tried to prevent the imminent demolition by seeking a 
preliminary injunction against Wolkoff under the Visual Artists Rights Act.”). 
 29  See Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“In denying 
the plaintiffs’ application for preliminary injunctive relief, the Court recognized that the rights 
created by VARA were at tension with conventional notions of property rights and tried to 
balance these rights. It did so by not interfering with Wolkoff’s desire to tear down the 
warehouses to make way for high-rise luxury condos, but cautioned that ‘defendants are 
exposed to potentially significant monetary damages if it is ultimately determined after trial that 
the plaintiffs’ works were of “recognized stature”’ under VARA.”) 
 30  Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 31  Id. at 214. 
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expert correctly acknowledged, VARA protects even temporary works 
from destruction, defendants are exposed to potentially significant 
monetary damages if it is ultimately determined after trial that the 
plaintiffs’ works were of “recognized stature.”32 
However, in the eight-day interim between the denial of the preliminary injunction 
and the judge’s written opinion, Wolkoff had workers whitewash the exterior of the 
building, thereby erasing almost all of the 5Pointz graffiti and rendering moot any 
possible injunctive relief.33 Thus, the artists’ only recourse was to sue for damages 
under VARA.34 They did so, and on February 12, 2018, Judge Block awarded the 
artists $6.75 million.35  
In his opinion, Judge Block notes that the “5Pointz litigation,” as he called it, was 
“the first occasion that a court has had to determine whether the work of an exterior 
aerosol artist—given its general ephemeral nature—is worthy of any protection under 
the law.”36 Thus, the ruling constitutes the first time such protection under VARA has 
been awarded by a United States court.37 Judge Block’s opinion discusses the 
temporary nature of most of the art at 5Pointz and the defendant’s contention that the 
artists were aware that the 5Pointz building would eventually be destroyed.38 
                                                          
 32  Id. at 227. 
 33  See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 427 (“Rather than wait for the Court’s opinion, which was 
issued just eight days later on November 20th, Wolkoff destroyed almost all of the plaintiffs’ 
paintings by whitewashing them during that eight-day interim.”). 
 34  See Laura Gilbert, New York Judge Awards 5Pointz Street Artists $6.75m for 
Whitewashed Works, ART NEWSPAPER (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/new-york-judge-awards-5pointz-street-artists-usd6-
75m-for-whitewashed-works (“Although he denied the injunction, Judge Block warned 
Wolkoff that he would be ‘exposed to potentially significant monetary damages if it is 
ultimately determined after trial that the plaintiffs’ works were of ‘recognized stature.’ Despite 
the court’s caution, the developer immediately directed that virtually all of the art be 
whitewashed, without giving the artists the necessary notice. None of the works were 
salvageable, the judge said.”). 
 35  See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 421, 448. The three-week trial was held before a jury, “but 
just prior to summations, plaintiffs—with defendants’ consent—waived their jury rights. Rather 
than summarily dismiss the jury after it had sat through the entire trial, the Court converted it to 
an advisory jury.” Id. at 427.  
 36  Id. (citing Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 214.). 
 37  See Alan Feuer, Judge Awards Graffiti Artists $6.7 Million for Destroyed 5Pointz 
Murals, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/nyregion/5pointz-
graffiti-judgment.html (“From the start, the 5Pointz case had pitted two of New York City’s 
most prominent sectors against each other: the art world and the real estate business. Judge 
Block’s ruling—and the size of the judgment he awarded—was a decisive victory for the 
former, said Dean Nicyper, a partner who specializes in art law at the firm Withers Bergman. 
‘There have been other instances where graffiti artists have been recognized as deserving 
protection,’ Mr. Nicyper said, adding that courts have ruled that clothing designers who cribbed 
ideas from graffiti artists were liable for intellectual theft. But the 5Pointz case, he said, was the 
first time that graffiti and graffiti artists were protected under V.A.R.A.”). 
 38  See Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (“Cohen and his fellow plaintiffs undoubtedly 
understood that the nature of the exterior aerosol art on Wolkoff’s buildings was transient.”); 
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According to Judge Block, “5Pointz was a site of creative destruction; most artworks 
had short lifespans and were repeatedly painted over by successive artists.”39 
Regarding Wolkoff’s testimony during trial, Judge Block writes, “[h]e was adamant 
that the artists knew that the day would come when the warehouse buildings bearing 
their works of art would come down and be replaced by high-rise residential 
condos.”40 The judge notes, “[d]efendants’ overarching contention is that plaintiffs 
knew that the day would come when the buildings would be torn down and that, 
regardless, the nature of the work of an outdoor aerosol artist is ephemeral. They 
argue, therefore, that VARA should not afford plaintiffs protection for their temporary 
works.”41  
However, Judge Block found no legal support for the argument that VARA does 
not protect temporary works of art, while offering myriad support for the position that 
such works of art are protected by VARA.42 Judge Block reasoned:  
VARA does not directly address whether it protects temporary works. 
However, in the context of works on buildings, it is clear from 17 U.S.C. § 
113(d) that temporary works are protected. Moreover, relevant case law 
conceptually supports this conclusion. In short, there is no legal support for 
the proposition that temporary works do not come within VARA’s 
embrace.43 
Judge Block’s opinion then addressed the issue of whether any 5Pointz work of art 
was of “recognized stature,” thus triggering VARA §106A(a)(3)(B), which gives 
visual artists the right to prevent the destruction of such work.44 The opinion 
acknowledges that VARA does not define the phrase “recognized stature” and states 
                                                          
Gilbert, supra note 34 (“The judge also rejected the defendants’ contention that the works were 
not entitled to legal protection because they were temporary and often painted over . . . .”). 
 39  Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 433. 
 40  Id. at 432; see also Eileen Kinsella, Who Owns Graffiti, the Artists or the Developers? A 
Landmark Trial over 5Pointz Considers This with Fresh Eyes, ARTNET (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/5pointz-lawsuit-could-be-a-key-test-of-artist-legal-rights-
1121624 (“Another key facet of the case—which the artists do not dispute—is that Wolkoff 
always made it clear that 5Pointz would not be permanent. The artists ‘did this work with eyes 
wide open. . . . They knew there was no permanency here,’ [Barry] Werbin notes.”); Schmidt, 
supra note 24 (“The landlord and his lawyer have contended that the artists knew for years that 
the buildings would ultimately be demolished. Wolkoff argued that even the artists would 
destroy artwork by constantly rotating thousands of short-term murals, according to court 
documents.”). 
 41  Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 435. In footnote 9, the judge wrote, “[w]hile Cohen 
acknowledged that he knew that Wolkoff intended to eventually tear down the buildings to make 
way for his new condos, other plaintiffs testified that they had no such knowledge. Regardless, 
even if the artists were allowed to waive their VARA rights orally (which they were not), none 
of the other artists ever spoke to Wolkoff. As he acknowledged at trial: ‘I didn’t know any of 
the artists. I only dealt with Jonathan Cohen.’” Id. at 435 n.9. 
 42  See id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  See id. at 437–39. 
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that “the seminal case interpreting the phrase”45 is Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,46 
which requires “a two-tiered showing that: (1) the visual art in question has ‘stature,’ 
i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2) this stature is ‘recognized’ by art experts, other 
members of the artistic community, or by some cross-section of society.”47  
Judge Block notes that the Second Circuit had not weighed in on Carter’s two-
tiered test48 but that the Seventh Circuit “did thereafter embrace and apply the district 
court’s standard for evaluating whether a work of visual art is of ‘recognized 
stature.’”49 However, though the Second Circuit had not assessed the Carter standard, 
it held in the Carter appeal50 that courts “should use common sense and generally 
accepted standards of the artistic community in determining whether a particular work 
falls within the scope of the definition”51 of “work of visual art.”52 Judge Block then 
recognized, “The same common sense should be utilized in assessing whether the 
visual work is of recognized stature . . . .”53  
Ultimately, Judge Block held: 
In the present case, the Court need not dwell on the nuances of the 
appropriate evidentiary standard since the plaintiffs adduced such a 
plethora of exhibits and credible testimony, including the testimony of a 
highly regarded expert, that even under the most restrictive of evidentiary 
                                                          
 45  See id. at 437. 
 46  861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1208 (1996). 
 47  Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 437. 
 48  See id. (“The Second Circuit on appeal never had occasion to address the correctness of 
this formulation since, in reversing, it held that the work did not qualify for VARA protection 
because it was made for hire.”) (citations omitted). 
 49  Id. at 438; see Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 50  Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).   
 51  Id. at 84 (quotation omitted). 
 52  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘work of visual art’ is—(1) a painting, drawing, print, or 
sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed 
and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, 
or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear 
the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic image produced 
for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. A 
work of visual art does not include—(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, 
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, 
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or 
similar publication; (ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, 
covering, or packaging material or container; (iii) any portion or part of any item described in 
clause (i) or (ii); (B) any work made for hire; or (C) any work not subject to copyright protection 
under this title.”). 
 53  See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 438. 
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standards almost all of the plaintiffs’ works easily qualify as works of 
recognized stature.54 
The court ruled that forty-five of the forty-nine works of art at issue were works of 
“recognized stature.”55 
Because the plaintiffs did not reliably establish a market value for their art, the 
court did not award actual damages.56 However, the court awarded statutory 
damages.57 After stating that Wolkoff willfully destroyed the works of art, the court 
listed the six statutory factors that must be weighed, when determining the amount of 
statutory damages.58 The court dismissed one of the six factors as irrelevant to the 
case,59 but held that, for the other five factors, “Wolkoff rings the bell on each,”60 
holding, “[c]ollectively, all five relevant factors support the maximum award of 
statutory damages. Therefore, the Court awards $150,000 for each of the forty-five 
works, for a total statutory damages award of $6,750,000.”61  
III. A CASE FOR REPEAL 
Before arguing against moral rights for visual artists by default and against 
VARA’s “recognized stature” provision, it is worth noting a common argument—
perhaps the main argument—for visual artists’ moral rights: Visual art is a unique 
creation that deserves special legal treatment. More specifically, economic rights 
alone do not sufficiently protect the special relationship that exists between an artist 
                                                          
 54  See id. 
 55  See id. at 440. 
 56  See id. at 442. 
 57  See id. at 447. 
 58  See id. at 445 (“When determining the amount of statutory damages to award for 
copyright infringement, courts consider: (1) the infringer’s state of mind; (2) the expenses 
saved, and profits earned, by the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the 
deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) the infringer’s cooperation in providing 
evidence concerning the value of the infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the 
parties.” (quoting Bryant v. Media Right Prods., 603 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 59  See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 445 n.21 (“The fifth factor does not fit this case. It is 
designed for traditional copyright cases where a defendant is liable for selling infringing 
material and the plaintiff’s damages proof requires evidence of defendant’s sales that can only 
be provided by defendant. Here, defendants destroyed, rather than sold, plaintiffs’ works, so 
this factor is inapplicable, and the Court will not consider it.” (citing Curet-Velazquez v. 
ACEMLA de Puerto Rico, Inc. 656 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2011)).  
 60  See Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 445. 
 61  See id. at 447. Judge Block then writes, “[i]f not for Wolkoff’s insolence, these damages 
would not have been assessed. If he did not destroy 5Pointz until he received his permits and 
demolished it 10 months later, the Court would not have found that he had acted willfully. Given 
the degree of difficulty in proving actual damages, a modest amount of statutory damages would 
probably have been more in order.” Id. A footnote adds, “Of course, all this could have been 
easily avoided with a written waiver of the artists’ VARA rights up front, as § 113(d) expressly 
contemplates.” Id. at n.22. 
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and her art.62 Thus, personal rights, not just property rights, are needed to protect artists 
and their work.63 
In her excellent article Against Moral Rights, which “seeks to undermine the 
foundations of moral rights scholarship, law, and theory,”64 Amy Adler explores the 
justifications for granting and protecting artists’ moral rights, when such protections 
are not similarly granted to other creations and products.65 Adler points to the beliefs 
that art is an extension of the artist into which the artist injects his spirit and that art is 
a unique and valuable thing worthy of preservation for posterity.66 Regarding 
Congress’s enactment of VARA, Professor Adler writes:  
                                                          
 62  See Lipton, supra note 11, at 502–03 (“However, copyrights do not fully capture the 
nature of the relationship between an author and her work. . . . Further, creators of copyright 
works engage in their artistic endeavors for reasons other than pecuniary reward. . . . Given the 
diverse motivations for creation and the variety of relationships authors have with their 
creations, a law that focuses purely on the protection of economic rights will miss important 
elements of the creative process.”); see also Laura Nakashima, Visual Artists’ Moral Rights in 
the United States: An Analysis of the Overlooked Need for States to Take Action, 41 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 203, 206, 230 (2000) (“The doctrine of moral rights recognizes that artists invest a part 
of themselves in the works they create, and as such, certain acts against the artists or their work 
jeopardize the artists' reputation. The doctrine realizes that allowing such acts to occur produces 
disincentives for artists to create, which harms the society that is then deprived of the artists’ 
creations. . . . The doctrine of moral rights originated in France as the civil law doctrine of ‘droit 
moral.’ Droit moral protects artists’ personality rights in their works of art based on the belief 
that an artist’s personality is embodied in, and inseparable from, her work of art. As an artist 
creates, ‘[s]he projects into the world part of [her] personality and subjects it to the ravages of 
public use.’ Thus, injuring an artist's work of art also injures her reputation. . . . The doctrine of 
moral rights serves the noble purpose of protecting artists' personality rights in their works of 
art that they share with the world. . . . By allowing artists to protect their personality rights 
embodied in their works of art, the doctrine of moral rights stimulates artists’ creativity, which 
then benefits the public who enjoys the artists’ works”).  
 63  See Lipton, supra note 11, at 508. 
 64  Adler, supra note 11, at 265. 
 65  Id. 
 66  See Adler, supra note 11, at 269–70 (“Why do we wish to preserve the integrity of art? 
And why do we grant moral rights only to the rarified category of ‘visual art’ and not to other 
objects? Embedded in moral rights law are two basic assumptions about visual art. First is that 
a work of art is an extension of the artist himself. I use the term ‘himself’ rather than ‘herself’ 
advisedly because of the language of ‘paternity’ that is a refrain in moral rights scholarship. 
Scholars invoke the metaphor of paternity to explain the artist’s profound connection with his 
work: he cares so deeply about the fate of his art because it is somehow his child and not just 
another object. Thus the artist feels personal anguish when someone else modifies his 
artwork/child. This is so even though the child has grown up and left home, and even though 
the artist/father has sold his child (more about commerce later). The work of art is not just 
another product he has sold, but rather an ‘expression of his innermost being.’ As the Second 
Circuit observed, moral rights ‘spring from a belief that an artist in the process of creation injects 
his spirit into the work.’ Indeed, moral rights advocates sometimes speak of art works as if they 
were living things: ‘To mistreat the work is to mistreat the artist.’ It is as if the work has a 
magical connection to its maker; hurting the piece will hurt the artist as if you were sticking 
pins in a voodoo doll. Because of this emphasis on the artist’s (and indeed, the art’s) personhood, 
moral rights are said to have a ‘spiritual, non-economic and personal nature.’ The second 
assumption embedded in moral rights law, deeply related to the first, is that works of visual art 
deserve special treatment in the law because they are especially valuable and unlike other 
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Members of Congress invoked the “special societal need” and “important public 
interest” served by the arts as a justification for enacting VARA. Members repeatedly 
noted the dual purposes of the bill to protect “not only . . . the artistic community, but 
also . . . the American public[’s] . . . access to artistic creations.67  
VARA and most U.S. state moral rights laws are premised on the view that 
moral rights serve not only the interests of individual artists, but also a 
shared public interest in art. VARA’s concern for the public interest is 
evident in its legislative history as well as its heightened protection for 
certain works that have achieved recognized stature.68 
In contrast to those beliefs, I believe visual art is not worthy of special treatment 
and should be governed by the same rules of property and contracts that govern any 
other product or creation.69 This argument does not flow from any aversion toward art 
                                                          
objects. As a prominent French legal decision explained, moral rights protect ‘the superior 
interests of human genius.’ We must preserve a work as the artist intended it so that his genius 
can be ‘conveyed to posterity without damage.’ Thus moral rights protect not only the 
personality interests of the individual artist; they also protect the public interest by preserving 
for posterity the object that immortalizes the traces of the artist’s greatness.”) (citations 
omitted); see also Jeffrey P. Cunard, Moral Rights for Artists: The Visual Artists Rights Act, 27 
CAA NEWS, May/June 2002, at 6–
8, https://pages.uoregon.edu/csundt/copyweb/CunardCAA2002.htm (“VARA, like other 
statutory copyright legislation, has both a private and a public justification. The first aim of the 
Act is to encourage visual artists to make and disseminate works of art by affording them certain 
protections and remedies against the destruction or damage to that art. The second aim is to 
preserve the artistic heritage for the benefit of society on the principle that living and working 
among works of art has positive societal effects.”) (citations omitted). 
 67  Adler, supra note 11, at 270. 
 68  Id. at 272. Interestingly, however, unlike an affected visual artist, the public typically has 
no cause of action under VARA, as does an affected visual artist. Adler writes that, “although 
VARA and most state statutes purport to protect both public and individual interests, these 
statutes vest sole power to enforce the moral right in the individual artist. They do so based on 
the assumption that there is an unproblematic convergence between the public interest and the 
interest of the artist who created the work. His decisions, according to the assumption, will 
inevitably be in the public interest. Thus, even in the case of a work of ‘recognized stature’ 
under VARA, only the artist can enforce or not enforce the right of integrity. The public has no 
cause of action. Moreover, the artist always has the right to destroy his work, even if it is a work 
‘of recognized stature’ and thus the kind of work that the public presumably has an interest in 
preserving.” Id. at 272–73. Adler notes that “California, however, allows an ‘organization acting 
in the public interest’ to bring a cause of action to protect a work of ‘fine art’ if it merits 
‘substantial public interest.’ Cal. Civ. Code § 989(a)(1), (c) (West 2006).” Id. at 272 n.53. 
 69  In this way, I echo Professor Adler, who writes, “Ultimately, I question the most basic 
premise of moral rights law: that law should treat visual art as a uniquely prized category that 
merits exceptions from the normal rules of property and contract.” Adler, supra note 11, at 265. 
Adler writes, “Here I want to confront a deeper problem at the heart of moral rights law: the 
doctrine’s very existence is premised on the idea that ‘the bond between an artist and his work 
is different from that between any other craftsman and his product.’ . . . In my view, this premise 
is problematic. What is so special about visual art? Why do we grant it special rights and treat 
it differently from other objects, excepting it from the normal rules of property and contract? At 
its heart, moral rights law rests on the notion that a work of visual art is not merely another 
product in our capitalist society. Instead, it is alive with the creative spirit of the individual 
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or artists. Rather, it springs only from the belief that art should not be treated uniquely, 
in contravention of normal common-law rules of property and contracts, and that 
doing so threatens the very foundations of these rights.70  
A. VARA’s Interference with Fundamental Common-Law Rights 
Private property rights and freedom of contract are fundamental aspects of our 
nation’s legal system. Such rights and freedoms existed in the American colonies 
before the United States was founded and were basic principles that the nation’s 
founders embedded in the United States Constitution.71 Moreover, property and 
contract rights have existed for hundreds of years in English common law, upon which 
American states’ legal systems are largely based.72 I contend that it is unreasonable to 
curtail such entrenched rights, based on the creation of controversial moral rights for 
visual artists that the United States did not recognize until 1990. But even then, these 
were recognized reluctantly, to comply with obligations under the Berne Convention, 
instead of as a result of a fundamental, philosophical shift regarding basic, common-
law rights.73 
                                                          
genius/artist who, to quote the Second Circuit, ‘injects’ himself into the work. His interests in 
the work are loftier and richer than mere pecuniary ones. Indeed they transcend his individual 
interests and become interests shared by the public. The mundane laws of copyright protect only 
economic interests. They could never fully capture what the artist and all of us value about 
artistic expression. Thus we must make special rules for works of art. But does visual art as a 
category merit this special treatment? I think the answer might be no. It once seemed obvious 
that there was a distinction between art and other objects. But that is no longer the case. Indeed, 
I would argue that the incoherence of the category of ‘art’ has become the subject of 
contemporary art. The lack of distinction between art and other objects is now a central 
preoccupation in contemporary art. Moral rights law thus protects art under a justification that 
is the very target of the art it purports to protect.” Id. at 294–95.  
 70  Though not a focus of this paper, another objection to recognizing moral rights for visual 
artists is the threat that it poses to free-speech rights under the First Amendment. See Dana L. 
Burton, Artists’ Moral Rights: Controversy and the Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 
639, 657 (1995) (“[George C. Smith] further suggests that VARA restrictions are an assault on 
free speech akin to that of the rejected flag protection amendment. The commentary urges that 
an individual should be able to buy a work which they consider, for example, pornographic, and 
destroy it as a political statement in the same manner that flag burning is permissible as an 
expression of free speech.”). 
 71  See Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the 
Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 
274 (1988). 
 72  Id. 
 73  Burton, supra note 70, at 641 (“The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives found that ‘existing law is sufficient to enable the United States to adhere to 
the Berne Convention, the implementing legislation is completely neutral on the issue of 
whether and how protection of the rights of paternity and integrity should develop in the future.’ 
Moreover, Senator Hatch stated that “while existing U.S. law satisfies U.S. obligations under 
article 6bis of Berne, our judicial system has consistently rejected causes of action denominated 
as ‘moral rights’ or arising under the moral rights doctrine.” Senator Hatch’s self-contradictory 
statement suggests that Congress, in an effort to meet merely the letter of the Berne Convention, 
speciously bootstrapped moral rights protection into existing U.S. law.”). As Professor Alder 
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VARA’s “recognized stature” provision interferes with these basic property and 
contract rights, including the right to license one’s property for a particular use by 
another party.74 A property owner who grants a license typically has the power to 
revoke the license at-will.75 Such should be the case with regard to allowing a visual 
artist to produce art on one’s property. The artist should be regarded merely as a 
licensee, whose permission to use the property for his art can be revoked at any time 
by the property owner. Nothing more should be required of the property owner, yet 
VARA’s “recognized stature” provision does just that, requiring the property owner 
to obtain a written, moral-rights waiver from the artist.76 VARA places on the property 
owner a burden that otherwise would not exist, a burden that does not apply to property 
licenses in other contexts.  
Additionally, a license is a contract, which by its very nature should involve only 
the terms and conditions agreed upon by the private parties who make it. In this 
context, those parties are the property owner and the visual artist, whose terms should 
not be interfered with, provided they do not violate the law. But VARA, in effect, adds 
a third-party to the contractual relationship. A judge’s or jury’s determination that a 
work of art is “of recognized stature” sweeps the aforementioned license within 
VARA’s reach and, thus, overrides the agreed-upon terms of the original parties. 
Moreover, it does so after the fact, after the license is granted. So, the duty that VARA 
imposes on the property owner is a duty to seek a written waiver from a visual artist, 
to protect herself should a judge or jury later decide that the art the license permitted 
is culturally important enough to protect, when such art would not be protected, had 
the factfinder decided the other way. This is an unreasonable restraint on freedom of 
contract that comes nowhere close to the common law’s normal reasons for overriding 
contracting parties’ agreed-upon terms. Courts typically will not enforce private 
agreements that violate the law (criminal or civil) or violate public policy; but in each 
case, a court’s decision not to honor the private parties’ agreed-upon terms is due to 
the court’s finding fault with one or more of the terms and/or a party’s consent to those 
terms. By contrast, in the case of VARA’s “recognized stature” provision, a court is 
adding a new term to the parties’ relationship, one to which they did not agree.  
Fundamentally, no property owner’s revocable grant should ever become 
irrevocable or otherwise lead to grantee rights the grantor did not agree to, absent the 
grantor’s express consent. No party—visual artist or otherwise—should be able to 
back his way into property rights not expressly granted by the respective property 
owner. This should be particularly true when those rights are due to a third-party’s 
subjective classification of a work of art, made after the property owner gave the artist 
permission to create the art. Given that the context here is a property owner giving 
permission to use a property for visual art, no argument can be made that an artist 
should acquire property rights not granted by the property owner, through concepts 
like adverse possession or prescriptive easement. One can take issue with the 
legitimacy of acquiring property rights by such means, but at least in such cases, the 
rights arise solely due to the actions or inactions of two parties (i.e., the property owner 
                                                          
notes, [m]oral rights were only recently and grudgingly accepted in the United States.” Adler, 
supra note 11, at 266. 
 74  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(B) (2012). 
 75  De Haro v. United States, 72 U.S. 599, 627 (1866). 
 76  17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2012). 
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and the party adversely using the property) and not due to any third-party actions. 
VARA permits a third-party’s subjective decision to label a work “of recognized 
stature” to impose a restraint on private property the property owner never agreed to.77 
There is no legitimate justification for such a restraint. 
Certainly, moral rights can be agreed to by the artist and the property owner, who 
can grant to the artist whatever protection she agrees to; but the granting of moral 
rights that trump property rights should never be, by statute or other means, the default 
rule. Far from placing upon a property owner, who might be unaware of VARA, the 
onus to seek a detailed, express waiver of moral rights by a visual artist,78 the burden 
should be on the artist to secure such rights, via express grant by the property owner. 
VARA’s “recognized stature” provision is antithetical to and, thus, should never 
trump, the ordinary rules of contract law and property law, absent an express waiver 
of the latter by real or personal property owners. 
B. VARA’s Fatally Subjective Language 
Even if one rejects the argument above and believes moral rights should, by 
default, trump private-property rights and freedom of contract, VARA contains 
several undefined concepts, leaving too much open to subjective interpretation to be 
justified. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) states a visual artist has the right to 
“prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work 
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,” but it does not specify 
what counts as prejudicing honor or reputation.79  More importantly, for purposes of 
this paper, 17 U.S.C. §106A(a)(3)(B) gives visual artists the right “to prevent any 
destruction of a work of recognized stature” but does not define “a work of recognized 
stature,” so its meaning is open to interpretation.80 Its use, then, is ripe for inconsistent 
results from factfinders, i.e., judges and juries.81 Thus, a work of art might be deemed 
                                                          
 77  See Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (E.D.N.Y 2018). 
 78  VARA’s waiver provision requires an express, written waiver signed by the author that 
specifically identifies the work and uses of that work that the waiver applies to. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106A(a)(B) (2012). 
 79  § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
 80  § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
 81  See Burton, supra note 69 at 648 (“The problem intensifies when the issues are put to a 
jury. The average layperson juror is not going to be able to determine what is prejudice to an 
artist’s honor or reputation or what a work of recognized stature is in light of the inevitable 
disagreement of art experts.”). Burton explains that VARA poses interpretation problems 
beyond the meaning of “a work of recognized stature,” writing, “The provisions of VARA have 
left much open to interpretation by the courts. For example, the statute provides protection of 
an artist’s work by creating a right to ‘prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.’ The 
statute fails, however, to define what is required for an act to be intentional or what qualifies as 
prejudice to an artist’s honor or reputation. It is unclear whether a person must intend to 
prejudice the artist's honor or reputation or only intend to alter the work. Moreover, the statute 
provides no guidance on what is required to prove intent or prejudice.” Id. (citations omitted); 
see also Cunard, supra note 66 (“The most influential case on this and many other VARA issues 
is Carter v. Helmsley-Spear . . . . Two sculptors sued building owners under both the 
modification and destruction clauses of VARA for damage to their lobby installation. Judge 
Edelstein of the Southern District of New York enunciated a test for recognized stature that 
required a two-part inquiry—that the work in question was meritorious and that the merit was 
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“of recognized stature” by one factfinder, while a different factfinder may reach the 
opposite conclusion. In addition, art that might be regarded as of “recognized stature” 
today might not be viewed as such at some future point (by different factfinders or 
even by the same factfinder), or vice versa. 
As noted above, the leading case regarding the determination of whether art is “a 
work of recognized stature” is Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,82 where the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York held:  
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (3) (B) provides that the author of a work of visual art 
shall have the right "to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized 
stature." This provision is preservative in nature: Congress was concerned 
that the destruction of works of art represented a significant societal 
loss. . . . The phrase “recognized stature” is not defined in VARA. In light 
of the preservative goal of this Section, however, the recognized stature 
requirement is best viewed as a gate-keeping mechanism protection is 
afforded only to those works of art that art experts, the art community, or 
society in general views as possessing stature. . . . The recognized stature 
requirement must be interpreted in such a manner as to maintain the 
preservative purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (3) (B) and in light of this 
Section's plain meaning. Thus, for a work of visual art to be protected under 
this Section, a plaintiff must make a two-tiered showing: (1) that the visual 
art in question has “stature,” i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that this 
stature is “recognized” by art experts, other members of the artistic 
community, or by some cross-section of society. In making this showing, 
plaintiffs generally, but not inevitably, will need to call expert witnesses to 
testify before the trier of fact. Finally, in order to be entitled to injunctive 
relief, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has commenced destruction 
of, or intends to destroy, the subject art work.83 
Here, too, subjective words create interpretation problems. The court says 
“stature” means “viewed as meritorious,” but what does “meritorious” mean?84 
Whether a piece of art has merit depends on how one defines “merit.” In this way, we 
are no closer to an interpretation that is not ripe for inconsistency. Additionally, the 
                                                          
recognized by some relevant section of society (critics, collectors, art historians, the local 
community, and so on). Although it was not the intent of the Act to require judges or juries 
(recognized stature is a question of fact) to make aesthetic judgments, such a test comes 
perilously close to it, and it appears that some judges since may have allowed their personal 
aesthetic bias to color their opinions. (See the dissenting opinion of Judge Manion in United 
States v. Martin, 192 F.3d 608 [7th Cir. 1999].) In assessing recognized stature, courts generally 
rely on expert testimony, but, as the Martin case illustrates, such testimony is not always 
necessary. Other forms of evidence—reviews of exhibitions in which the work appears, other 
critical comment, catalogues, and newspaper articles can all be employed. Interestingly, Judge 
Edelstein noted that VARA does not specify when a work might have obtained recognized 
stature, raising the possibility that the destruction of the work and the subsequent litigation 
might alone ‘generate’ the required stature.”) (citations omitted). 
 82  861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1208 (1996). 
 83  Id. at 324–25. 
 84  Id. at 325. 
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court says that “this stature is ‘recognized’ by art experts, other members of the artistic 
community, or by some cross-section of society.”85 Again, what qualifies as being 
“recognized” and what does not? Which “experts,” which “other members of the 
artistic community,” and which “cross-section of society” get to make this 
determination? How many experts or others must agree? What if half of the most well-
known art “experts” think a piece of art is of “recognized stature,” but the other half 
do not? Which half prevails? The determination of whether art is of “recognized 
stature” will depend, then, not only on the factfinder, but also on each witness who 
offers testimony. Surely art is in the eye of the beholder and cannot be measured, 
graded, or judged by anything close to an objective standard.  
In his 2018 5Pointz ruling, Judge Block stated that “common sense should be 
utilized in assessing whether the visual work is of recognized stature.”86 However, just 
as “recognized stature” and “meritorious” are subjective, “common sense” is a 
subjective phrase, open to varying interpretations and application. The fact VARA 
leaves so much open to subjective interpretation is reason enough not to prioritize its 
protections over the common law’s far-more-objective rules of property and contracts. 
One can objectively determine ownership of property via deed. One can objectively 
prove the existence of a binding agreement via signed contract (among other ways). 
But one cannot objectively determine whether a work of art is one “of recognized 
stature.” And given that art is ever-changing, it stands to reason that increasingly more 
works of art could meet the loose standard of “work of recognized stature” and that, 
as a result, more and more properties would be swept within VARA’s reach. Certainly, 
nothing this subjective should ever, by default, trump our nation’s long-held rights 
regarding private property and contracts. Judge Block acknowledges that a test to 
determine what qualifies as a “work of recognized stature” that is too lenient risks 
curtailing legitimate property interests;87 but my contention is that any test—no matter 
how lenient or strict—that permits a third-party factfinder to determine subjectively 
that a piece of art is a “work of recognized stature” illegitimately curtails property 
rights. The absence of a consistent, objective standard alone should foreclose the 
possibility that visual artists’ moral rights trump the rights of property owners.  
However, as stated above, even if one could objectively determine whether a work 
of art is “a work of recognized stature,” that art’s fate should still be determined 
according to the normal rules of contracts and private property, because pre-existing 
rights to property and contractual freedom should never be subservient to 
determinations of third parties. Quite simply, VARA interferes with one’s freedom to 
bind oneself to another only to the extent of their contractual agreement with one 
another and interferes with one’s ability to use her property as she sees fit.   
C. VARA’s “Visual Art” Exclusions 
In addition to VARA’s subjective language, another reason to object to VARA is 
that it specifically lists which art is and which art is not “visual art,” for purposes of 
the statute.88 By statutorily excluding certain art from VARA’s coverage, Congress 
undercuts VARA’s imposition of moral rights on the grounds that visual art, unlike 
                                                          
 85  Id. 
 86  See Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 438 (E.D.N.Y 2018). 
 87  Id.  
 88  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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other types of art, is unique and worthy of special treatment. According to 17 U.S.C. 
§101: 
A “work of visual art” is— 
 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a 
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, 
carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively 
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of 
the author; or 
 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, 
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition 
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the 
author. 
 
A work of visual art does not include— 
 
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, 
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, 
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic 
publication, or similar publication; 
 
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, 
covering, or packaging material or container; 
 
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii); 
 
(B) any work made for hire; or 
 
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.89 
Why is a limited-edition work of more than 200 copies not considered “a work of 
visual art?” Why is a piece of art not “a work of visual art” if it is made for hire?90 Is 
it not conceivable that an item used for advertising or promotion could be as culturally 
significant as one that is not? Such disqualifying conditions weaken the already weak 
position that art is worthy of moral rights protection, particularly in the case of art that 
is deemed “a work of recognized stature.” Whether a piece of art is “a work of 
recognized stature” is an inherently subjective determination, but even if it were not, 
a piece of art deemed worthy of that label should be worthy of that label regardless of 
how many copies of it exist, whether it was made for hire, or regardless of any other 
reason. If such factors, at least one of which (number of copies) seems entirely 
arbitrary, affect whether the art qualifies for VARA protection at all, then a statute that 
                                                          
 89  Id. For an in-depth look at these “visual art” exclusions, see Shipley, supra note 12, at 
1000–20. 
 90  David Shipley writes that “the idea that the employee-artist does not have moral rights 
in the creations done for an employer is antithetical to moral rights theory.” See id. at 1010. 
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prioritizes artists’ moral rights over the traditional rights of property owners is even 
less justified than it already is.  
D. Berne Convention Compliance Without VARA §106A(a)(3)(B)? 
A final reason to be troubled by VARA’s threat to traditional property and contract 
rights is that Congress included Section 106A(a)(3)(B) in VARA despite the 
possibility that complying with the Berne Convention does not require statutorily 
granting the moral right to prevent destruction of art.91 Article 6bis(1) of the treaty 
states: “Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of 
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action 
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”92 
The word “destruction” is not stated in the section. Professor Adler notes that “VARA 
expands the right of integrity, allowing the artist to prevent not merely modification 
but outright destruction of the work.93  
So, a statute that interferes with traditional rights of property owners was enacted 
by Congress solely to comply with an international treaty and includes a section 
arguably unnecessary for such compliance. Thus, were the United States to repeal 
Section 106A(a)(3)(B), it may very well still meet the Berne Convention requirements. 
However, even if a court found the right to prevent destruction of art to be implicitly 
included in Section 106A(a)(3)(A), the subjective determination of whether the 
destruction of a piece of art prejudiced the artist’s honor or reputation would still need 
to be made. Again, the language of VARA leaves much to interpretation. My position, 
quite simply, is that compliance with an international treaty is an illegitimate reason 
                                                          
 91  See Lipton, supra note 11, at 506, 510 (“It is also unclear from the wording of Article 
6bis(1) whether destruction of a work by a copyright holder falls within the scope of the right 
of integrity. The Convention requires that an author should have the right to object to “distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action” in relation to the work. It is 
unclear whether or not this encompasses destruction of the work, particularly in cases where the 
destruction does not affect the “honor or reputation” of the author. In fact, many countries with 
well-developed moral rights laws do not protect authors against destruction of a work . . . the 
precise interpretation of Article 6bis, and the way in which signatory countries choose to 
implement its provisions, varies widely.”). Citing Lipton, id., Shipley writes, “[r]ecognition of 
a moral right against destruction is not universal.” Shipley, supra note 11, at 1021 n.192; see 
also Cunard, supra note 66 (“One of the more controversial details of VARA is the ‘recognized 
stature’ hurdle for protection against complete destruction of a work. Many other countries give 
no moral-rights protection against an artwork’s complete destruction on the principle that a 
piece which ceases to exist cannot be prejudicial to an artist’s honor and reputation in the way 
that an existing work which misrepresents the artist can.”).  
 92  Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6.  
 93  Adler, supra note 11, at 267. Adler notes, “[t]he right to prevent destruction is not 
universal in civil law countries. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 861 F. Supp. 303, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1208 (1996). 
This variation illustrates the different purposes that moral rights laws serve. To the extent that 
the right of integrity serves primarily to protect the artist’s reputational interest, destruction 
tends not to be prevented; the theory is that continued display of mutilated work misrepresents 
an artist’s intention and thus harms him more than if the work were destroyed altogether. To the 
extent that the right of integrity is seen as primarily protecting the public interest in preserving 
cultural heritage, destruction is prohibited.” Id. at 320 n.17. 
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to prioritize visual artists’ moral rights above the traditional rights of property owners. 
But at the very least, such compliance should not add rights for visual artists not 
expressly called for by said treaty. By expanding such rights for visual artists via 
VARA, Congress paved the way for the unjust ruling against Wolkoff, the property 
owner in the 5Pointz litigation.  
E. Reflections on 5Pointz Ruling 
Turning to the 5Pointz litigation, I offer that no principle of contract or property 
law justifies imposing upon Wolkoff, the property owner, any obligation or liability 
with respect to the art produced on his property. The location that would become 
5Pointz existed long before the art of 5Pointz existed.94 Wolkoff did not purchase the 
property subject to any limitations, such as an historic-landmark designation or in-
gross easement.95 Wolkoff took the property free and clear of any such 
encumbrances.96 He was first-in-time and, as such, should have been first-in-right, 
with regard to use of the property, free to do with his private property as he saw fit.97  
As the property owner, Wolkoff could have denied Cohen and the other artists 
permission to use his property for their graffiti. In other words, the only reason the 
artistic endeavor known as 5Pointz existed is that Wolkoff allowed it to happen. As 
such, Wolkoff’s permission should most appropriately be seen as the granting of a 
license, which a grantor can revoke at will. Given that the artists had Wolkoff’s 
permission, no argument can be made that the artists acquired property rights via a 
prescriptive easement in-gross or via adverse possession. Wolkoff granted Cohen and 
others permission to use his property for their art only for a limited time.98 The terms 
of their arrangement were agreed upon by Wolkoff and Cohen, and only those terms 
should be enforced.99 The fact that a judge later subjectively decided that the 5Pointz 
art was of “recognized stature” should not have altered in any way the agreement 
between Wolkoff and Cohen.  Far from being liable for any, much less millions in 
damages, Wolkoff’s actions should have been regarded as firmly within his legal 
rights. He was and is the injured party. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 5Pointz ruling reveals the substantial threat the Visual Artists Rights Act poses 
to our nation’s long-standing commitment to private property and freedom of contract. 
A property owner granted graffiti artists permission to use his property for their art, 
with the understanding that the property and, thus, their art would one day be 
destroyed. When it ultimately was destroyed, the artists sued for damages under 
VARA, which gives visual artists the moral right to prevent destruction of a “work of 
                                                          
 94  See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 432 (E.D.N.Y 2018). 
 95  See id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954). 
 98  Cohen, F. Supp. 3d at 431. 
 99  Id. at 433. 
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recognized stature.”100 A federal district judge decided the works at issue were works 
of “recognized stature” and awarded the plaintiffs damages of $6.75 million.101 
The property owner’s granting of permission to the artists was simply a license to 
use his property for a limited purpose for a limited time. He could have denied such 
permission entirely but chose to open his property to the artists, thus allowing their art 
to flourish for years. Because he did not obtain from the artists a written waiver of 
their moral rights per VARA, he ended up on the wrong end of a multi-million-dollar 
verdict.  
Nothing about this outcome comports with traditional rules of property law or 
contract law. Years after the agreement regarding permission to use his property was 
reached, a judge’s decision that the destroyed art was of “recognized stature” meant 
that the property owner’s failure to obtain a written waiver from the artists exposed 
him to liability under VARA. But the law should not place upon a property owner the 
burden of obtaining a written waiver to protect himself should a judge or jury later 
make a subjective determination that a piece of art is a “work of recognized stature.” 
Rather, the burden should be on an artist to secure from the property owner a grant of 
moral rights, with respect to art on his property. In other words, if a party wishes to 
secure moral rights to art drawn on another’s property, that party should receive such 
rights only via the property owner’s express permission, rather than receiving such 
rights by default. 
A visual artist’s moral right not to have a “work of recognized stature” destroyed 
creates a default rule that violates individual property rights under the common law. 
The possibility that a judge or jury will subjectively determine that a work of art is “a 
work of recognized stature” and  thus, the work cannot be destroyed, jeopardizes 
property owners’ abilities to use their properties as they see fit, to be bound 
contractually according only to the terms of their contracts, and places upon property 
owners a burden (securing a written waiver of an artist’s moral rights) that traditional 
rules of property and contracts do not require. And since VARA does not define 
“recognized stature,” the application of the provision is ripe for inconsistent outcomes.  
In short, VARA illegitimately places subjectively determined moral rights above 
far-more objective property and contract rights. One’s right to control his property 
should not be subject to a third party’s judgment call regarding how culturally 
significant a work of art drawn on that property is. If one’s freedom to control his 
property is to be curtailed because of art he allows to be drawn on his property, then 
such curtailment should be due to his expressly encumbering his property, not due to 
a court’s encumbering it after the fact. Moreover, there is no compelling reason to give 
special treatment to visual art that is not given to other creations or products, 
particularly given the fact that how one views art is subjective and that “art” is an ever-
changing concept. Nothing so subjective and fluid justifies departing from normal 
rules of property and contract. As such, §106A(a)(3)(B), VARA’s “recognized 
stature” provision, should be repealed, fully restoring traditional rights to property 
owners. 
 
                                                          
 100  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(B) (2012). 
 101  Cohen, F. Supp. 3d at 428.  
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